Gill reference tracker2/20/2023 ![]() ![]() IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). Implementing and proving the TLS 1.3 record layer. Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Jonathan Protzenko, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Jianyang Pan, and Jean Karim Zinzindohoue.ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). A comprehensive symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3. Cas Cremers, Marko Horvat, Jonathan Hoyland, Sam Scott, and Thyla van der Merwe.ProxySG, ASG and WSS will interrupt SSL connections when clients using TLS 1.3 access sites also using TLS 1.3. SoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting past challenges and evaluating certificate trust model enhancements. In IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). Efficient gossip protocols for verifying the consistency of certificate logs. Verified models and reference implementations for the TLS 1.3 standard candidate. Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, and Nadim Kobeissi.In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT). FLEXTLS: a tool for testing TLS implementations. Benjamin Beurdouche, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Nadim Kobeissi, Alfredo Pironti, and Karthikeyan Bhargavan.Applying Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS extensibility. Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time. In Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO). The multi-user security of authenticated encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3. In International Conference on Provable Security. Augmented secure channels and the goal of the TLS 1.3 record layer. Christian Badertscher, Christian Matt, Ueli Maurer, Phillip Rogaway, and Björn Tackmann.Alex Halderman, Viktor Dukhovni, Emilia Käsper, Shaanan Cohney, Susanne Engels, Christof Paar, and Yuval Shavitt. Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel, Juraj Somorovsky, Nadia Heninger, Maik Dankel, Jens Steube, Luke Valenta, David Adrian, J.Extracting certificates from live traffic: a near real-time SSL notary service. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC). No attack necessary: the surprising dynamics of SSL trust relationships. Johanna Amann, Robin Sommer, Matthias Vallentin, and Seth Hall.ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). Mission accomplished? HTTPS security after DigiNotar. Lucky Thirteen: breaking the TLS and DTLS record protocols. You get TLS 1.3! You get TLS 1.3! Everyone gets TLS 1.3!. ![]() of the International Web Conference (WWW). Here's my Cert, so trust me, maybe? Understanding TLS errors on the Web. Imperfect forward secrecy: how Diffie-Hellman fails in practice. ![]() Alex Halderman, Nadia Heninger, Drew Springall, Emmanuel Thomé, Luke Valenta, Benjamin VanderSloot, Eric Wustrow, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, and Paul Zimmermann. David Adrian, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Zakir Durumeric, Pierrick Gaudry, Matthew Green, J.A high-performance DNS stub resolver in C. This story cannot be captured by a single dataset alone, highlighting the need for multi-perspective studies on Internet evolution. We show that Cloudflare alone brings deployment to sizable numbers and describe how actors like Facebook and Google use their control over both client and server endpoints to experiment with the protocol and ultimately deploy it at scale. Very few giant, global actors drive the development. We show that the development and fast deployment of TLS 1.3 is best understood as a story of experimentation and centralization. Deployment on popular domains is at 30% and at about 10% across the com/net/org top-level domains (TLDs). Just 15 months after standardization, it is used in about 20% of connections we observe. In contrast to TLS 1.2, where adoption took more than five years and was prompted by severe attacks on previous versions, TLS 1.3 is deployed surprisingly speedily and without security concerns calling for it. For a profound view, we combine and analyze data from active domain scans, passive monitoring of large networks, and a crowd-sourcing effort on Android devices. We use the rare opportunity to track deployment, uptake, and use of a new mission-critical security protocol from the early design phase until well over a year after standardization. It was standardized in August 2018 after a four year-long, unprecedented design process involving many cryptographers and industry stakeholders. Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 is a redesign of the Web's most important security protocol. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply.AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |